POST-DOC in the Project Novel Business Models and mechanisms for the sustainable supply of and payment for forest ecosystem services (NOBEL) – ANR Funding- 2019-2021

Required skills in EXPERIMENTAL AND EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS


Objective of the post doc project:

To develop a web-based platform that will be used in real to bring together interested consumers and providers of forest ecosystem services in European case study areas.

Detailed Description

Different auction designs relevant for web-based platforms will be tested. The platform will be designed to facilitate the interaction between consumers (individual consumers/companies/NGOs) and forest owners, e.g. including maps of potential ecosystem service provision. The final objective is to provide guidelines for implementing auction mechanisms for provision of forest ecosystems services including an assessment of consumers' expected voluntary contribution to ES provision.

Overview of the NOBEL project



Tasks for the post doc

1/ To test different auction mechanisms for different ecosystem services in lab experiments on students and on stakeholders

2/ Based on these experiments to contribute to the development of guidelines for developing platforms to be tested in the field with forest owners and other stakeholders in up till six different countries

Requirement: A PhD degree in economics or similar

Skills and requirements

- Environmental economics
- Experimental-empirical economics
- Team work: Being involved in the NOBEL project implies intensive interactions with other project partners and with stakeholders.
- Speaking English fluently

It is an advantage if the candidate has experiences with:

- Computational forest economics
- Ecosystem system service analysis
- GIS and spatial analysis
- Choice modeling and discrete choice experiments
- Carrying out surveys
- Speaking French

Remuneration: Gross salary: € 2,516/month?

Duration: 18 months

To apply: An application letter, a CV and a copy(s) of diploma(s) must be sent in electronic format to Anne Stenger, INRA BETA, anne.stenger-letheux@inra.fr. **Deadline**: Applications will be reviewed immediately and will be accepted until the position is filled.

Contacts : Anne Stenger, INRA BETA, <u>anne.stenger-letheux@inra.fr</u> and Jens Abildtrup, <u>jens.abildtrup@inra.fr</u>

References

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