

Ecosystem services on forested lands: an experiment on the role of auction format and communication

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Highlights

- We conducted an experiment on procurement auctions for ecosystem services
- We allowed for heterogeneous production & environmental values and spatial dependencies
- Discriminatory pricing led to greater ecosystem benefits than uniform pricing
- Allowing communication between subjects improved coordination of sellers
- Communication also facilitated collusion, leading to a neutral overall effect

Abstract

Procurement auctions are one of several policy tools available to manage provision of ecosystem services including biodiversity. Successful biodiversity conservation often requires a landscape-scale approach. In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to explore two features of procurement auctions in the forest context—the pricing mechanism (uniform vs. discriminatory) and availability of communication (chat). We modify the experimental design developed by Reeson et al. (2011) by introducing uncertainty (and hence heterogeneity) in the production value of forest sites as well as automated, endogenous stopping rule. We find that discriminatory pricing yields to greater environmental benefits per government’s dollar spent, chiefly due to better coordination between owners of adjacent plots. Chat also facilitates such coordination but also seems to encourage collusion in sustaining high prices for the most environmentally attractive plots. These two effects offset each other, making chat neutral from the viewpoint of the government.

1. Introduction

Procurement auctions (competitive tenders) are one of several policy tools available to manage provision of ecosystem services. They are a proven method to ensure efficient allocation of limited ecosystem services payments. Biodiversity is one of ecosystem services which has been attracting an increased attention during the last two decades.

For a resource owner, taking part in such a mechanism usually means giving up some private income, e.g., from timber sales, in exchange for a payment for providing ecosystem services, e.g., biodiversity protection. The amount of the lost income of the resource owner, if they were required to provide at a particular site, may well be known only to them. Conservation auctions have been attracting increased attention as a way to manage ecosystem services because they enable the selection of individuals' bids that provide the best value for money, overcome information asymmetries concerning resource owners' private costs and limit their strategic behavior (Ferraro, 2008, Reeson et al., 2011). In the case, however, of auctions for the provision of ecosystem services (APES), the social benefits often depend on the spatial configuration of sites, and because of this the effectiveness of the mechanism requires a landscape-scale-approach rather than each bid being individually considered (Goldman et. al, 2007). The effective metric of environmental outcome should be based on all possible combinations of plots within the budget constraint. Due to the nature of the provision of ecosystem services, it would appear natural in this case to use complex multi-unit procurement auctions to select bids

that are optimal from the social point of view (Latacz-Lohmann and Schillizi 2005, Ferraro 2008).

One of the first to use auction theory to analyze the provision of ecosystem services were Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997). They analyzed the potential benefits of auctions in allocating contracts for the provision of nonmarket goods in the countryside. The auction was applied to a hypothetical conservation program. The authors concluded that auctions are a valuable tool in allocating conservation contracts among farmers.

Recently, experiments have proved to be a very useful tool for the test-bedding of increasingly complex APES designs. Jack et al. (2009) conducted a field experiment within the context of reducing soil erosion in a coffee-producing region in Indonesia. Their study illustrated an auction-based approach to revealing private information about the costs of supplying ecosystem services. The data were collected on a sample of landowners from two villages. The auction mechanism was uniform-price and the design did not allow for interdependence of the landowners' offers. The study of Rolfe et al. (2009) focused on improved vegetation management by the beef grazing industry in Australia. They applied a field experiment to test the cost efficiencies of a multiple bidding round auction where landowners are unfamiliar with conservation tender processes and the supply of environmental services. Their results suggest that multiple bidding rounds have the potential to deliver efficiency gains in conservation auctions. Reeson et al. (2011) focused on the spatial aspect of APES in a neutral framing; adapting auctions to promote

connectivity between sites. In their lab experiment, they considered a homogeneous landscape of 400 plots, divided among 10 owners/bidders. Each plot would bring the owner a fixed production value, unless used to provide ES. They investigated multi-round auctions. The number of rounds was exogenously fixed and made known to subjects in one experimental condition while concealed in another. The authors also investigated the effect of the lock-in rule, i.e., subjects could only make up to two new bids in one condition and in another they could additionally modify bids made in past rounds. They found that unknown number of rounds and the lock-in rule tended to deliver the highest environmental benefit within the budget constraint.

In this paper, using a lab experiment we focus on testing an auction mechanism for the provision of ecosystem services in the context of forest biodiversity protection . Forest-related (rather than neutral) framing is used to make the situation more realistic for the subjects and to help them understand this relatively complex design. A point in case was a national park (NP) surrounded by hitherto unprotected private forests. Such a situation is quite often observed in the European context. The spatial issue is implemented into the design by offering explicit bonuses for the proximity of the forest plots to the NP (creating a buffer zone) and habitat connectivity. Finally, communication is implemented in a simple way, leaving in the groups with chat the option to communicate or not.

We build upon the experimental design developed by Reeson et al. (2011) by introducing four principal modifications.

First, we account for uncertainty and hence heterogeneity in the production value of plots. In our experiment, the production values differ not only between forest owners but also within their properties. The rationale behind that is the fact that forests are usually not homogenous and differ in terms of tree species, age and density, and thus they deliver different production values.

Second, we use an automated, endogenous stopping rule—the auction stops when there is little change in behavior over a few rounds, rather than after some predetermined number of rounds. If subjects know which round is going to be the last one, they have limited incentive to bid carefully, let alone truthfully, in all the previous rounds. Furthermore, with a fixed number of rounds it may well be that the auction stops prematurely (before equilibrium is reached) or too late (so that bidders' time is wasted and they are tempted to start sending collusive signals, etc.).

Third, unlike Reeson et al. (2011), we analyze two different auction formats: discriminatory and uniform. Both of them have their merits in practical applications. In the discriminatory auctions, transaction prices are determined in a straightforward manner—they are identical to (accepted) offers—and this simplicity is a major virtue in these otherwise complicated markets. On the other hand, uniform auctions place less burden on the participants as far as the determination of their bidding strategy is concerned—bidding their own reservation prices is a reasonable option under uniform pricing only (although it is generally speaking not an equilibrium strategy as will be discussed later). For the same reason, their results are very likely to be more informative for the auctioneer, i.e. she learns more

about the actual sellers' reservation prices. Finally, given that the resulting transaction prices are identical, the sellers may consider this auction format as more fair.

The last of principal modifications involves examining the effect of communication between subjects in the course of the auction. From practical viewpoint, this is an important consideration in APES because, firstly the owners of specific plots will typically know each other and might indeed want to coordinate their strategies and secondly, complex, multi-round auctions will often give the participants enough time to communicate.

The main objective of the paper is to explore the consequences of: (1) two different auction formats: discriminatory vs. uniform, (2) the possibility of communication between participants. In familiar single-object auctions, where just one unit of good may change hands, the analogue of the discriminatory auction is the first-price sealed-bid auction, while second-price (Vickrey, 1961) auction is the relative of the uniform auction formats. The properties of these two variants are well understood. Assuming private values (each bidder knows his valuation and does not care how much others would be willing to pay), second-price auctions induce truth-telling (bids identical to reservation prices) and first-price involves just the right degree of bid shading to make the expected revenue identical for the seller. In either case the auction is efficient, i.e. the player with higher valuation will always win the auction. The case of multiple potential sellers and single bidder interested in one unit (procurement auctions) which is obviously the relevant one for APES is just the mirror image – they should request more than the reservation price under first-price rules only.

The reason why (single-object) second-price auctions induce truthful bidding is simple: each buyer only submits one bid, so if his bid affects the price – he is not the winner, because

his bid is only second-highest. There is thus no reason to shade the bids. In this sense, strategic uncertainty that the bidders are facing is reduced which is believed to encourage entry (also of less experienced bidders) and reduce costs. It is tempting to extend this reasoning to multiple-object auctions (in which buyers submit a number of bids for the first, second, ... n -th unit—a demand schedule). As a matter of fact, an economist not less eminent than Milton Friedman has advocated the use of the uniform format (as applied to treasury auctions) by claiming “You do not have to be a specialist. You need only know the maximum amount you are willing to pay for different quantities.” (Wall Street Journal of 28 August, 1991). Alas, this is an oversimplification. In the case of multiple bids, any buyer’s lower bid can affect the price charged on a (successful) higher bid so some shading pays off. In our case of uniform price auction with a spatial aspect finding a solution seems very difficult. Nevertheless, by analogy with the simpler situations sketched above, we generally expect offers in the discriminatory treatment to be higher than reservation prices and higher than analogous offers in the uniform treatment.

It is also an interesting open question of how communication may affect auction results. It is not so in standard auctions—there we expect that it will facilitate collusion, thereby decreasing the auctioneer’s revenue (or, in procurement auction as in our case, increasing the amount she will have to pay). In the case of auctions for the provision of ecosystem services, where efficiency may depend on participants’ ability to coordinate strategies with their neighbors, such that larger contagious areas of wildlife protection are created, communication may turn out to support the auctioneer’s effort to maximize environmental benefits.

2. Methods

2.1. Design

Participants of the experiment were divided into groups of 6 (typically, there were 18 subjects in one session). Each of them was assigned a property consisting of 16 *plots* (see Figure 1 showing the initial information displayed to subject owning plots A3-D6, the white lines delineating each player's property). Each property was a 4x4 square, except for the subject holding A1-D4 and A11-D12 squares, although this makes no strategic difference. Each plot had specific *production value* (PV) in experimental dollars (ED), drawn independently from a $U(50,150)$ that could be realized if that particular plot was retained by the owner at the end of the experiment. Each owner could also offer any subset of his plots at any plot-specific prices expressed in ED he wished at a multi-round auction run by an automated *government*.




Figure 1. Screenshot showing the initial information displayed to subject owning plots A3-D6.

Note: “Park narodowy” means national park in English. Production values are shown in the upper-right corner of each plot

In each round, the government would “provisionally purchase” such a combination of plots offered by some or all the sellers that would maximize *environmental value* (EV) per experimental dollar spent on purchases, subject to the constraint that an amount between 4000 and 5000 ED is spent. Environmental value of any combination of plots that could be purchased would be calculated as follows:

- one point per each plot purchased in columns A-F,
- two points per each plot purchased in columns G-H,

- additionally one point for each two purchased plots sharing a vertical border (i.e. constituting a horizontal corridor)¹.

In setting these rules we were trying to mimic some characteristic features of usefulness of ecosystem services. First, the plots close to the existing wilderness (the National Park) were considered more valuable. Second, creation of corridors stretching out of the wilderness, facilitating migration of wild animals, was appreciated. At the same time, the rules were kept as simple as possible. By assigning one of the owners a discontinuous A1-D4, A11-D12 property we have made sure that each participant had exactly two neighbors with whom to build horizontal corridors – the situation was strategically identical for each of the three A-D owners and similarly among the three E-H owners.

The experiment would end for the group if the environmental value per ED spent failed to improve by more than 5% in each of 5 consecutive rounds (and otherwise it would end after round 30). The provisional purchases would then become actual

¹ For example, if the government buys plots 6-D, 6-E, 7-E, 7-F and 7-G the total environmental value (EV) equals:

$$1 \text{ [for 6-D]} + 1 \text{ [6-E]} + 1 \text{ [7-E]} + 1 \text{ [7-F]} + 2 \text{ [7-G is in the buffer zone]} + 1 \text{ [bonus for adjacent 6-D and 6-E]} + 1 \text{ [bonus for adjacent 7-E and 7-F]} + 1 \text{ [bonus for adjacent 7-F and 7-G]} = 9$$

The EV bonus connected with creating a horizontal connection does not take into account whether the plots belonged to one or two participants.

The example of the entire experimental instruction (the treatment combination: uniform and chat) can be found at: www.....

purchases and the subjects would earn the amount in ED resulting from adding up the production values of non-sold plots and transaction prices of sold plots. It would be exchanged into Polish Zloty (zł) at the rate of $1ED=0.015$ zł (ca. 4 eurocent). If the round was not the final one, the offers made in it had no direct impact but would by default be proposed for the subsequent round (yet they could be altered, altogether removed or supplemented with offers for previously un-offered plots at subjects' discretion).

2.2. Subjects' information

Subjects were presented with a map showing private forest properties and the boundary of the State-owned National Park. Every subject knew all production values of own but not others' plots (see Figure 1). They knew that the automated government aimed at possibly high environmental value and how it was calculated (see above).

After each round subjects were shown all subjects' bids and their locations. The bids were marked in the way to distinguish provisional winners from losers (see Figure 2). Subjects were not informed about the exact stopping rule – they were told that each round could prove to be the last one (and thus its results would matter for real).




Figure 2. Screenshot showing bids which were provisionally successful at which price (the discriminatory version with chat).

Note: This is an example of the screen shot shown to the participant owning plots A3-D6. The provisionally winning bids from the previous round are marked red for the subject A3D6 and orange for others and shown prior to the start of the next round. Bid levels are displayed in bottom-left corner of each plot.

2.3. Experimental treatments

Each group would operate under one of two auction formats. Under Discriminatory condition, each accepted plot would be purchased at the price offered. Under Uniform condition, all purchases in columns A-F had to be at the same price. Similarly, all plots purchased in columns G-H would be bought at the same price.

This distinction would be crossed with the availability of chat: in ca. half the groups the subjects were allowed to send any chat message to any combination of other participants at any time. They were free to communicate or not². In the no-chat condition, no communication was allowed whatsoever. Table 1 shows the number of groups in each of four resulting treatments.

Table 1. Experimental treatments: number of groups

Treatment	Discriminatory (D)	Uniform (U)
Chat (C)	6	6
No chat (NC)	7	7

2.4. Procedures

The experiment was conducted in the spring of 2013 at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics at the University of Warsaw, using the local (student) subject pool. It was computerized using Python-based program.³ Printed instructions were used. Both software and instructions were perfected in pilot sessions to ensure that subjects had no problem understanding their decision environment. 11 sessions with 1 to 3 groups each were run. A short post-experiment questionnaire was deployed to collect demographic data. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample which shows that subjects were in majority students, females and used to lab experiments.

²² It could have been interesting to know for each round the number of subjects who chatted and to how many subjects but it is really complex to have this information. So the difference between chat and non chat treatments will be according to the possibility to communicate or not, giving the subjects in chat treatment the feelings to better exchange even to find some strategic bids.

³ The program was developed by Jean-Marc Rousselle of INRA-LAMETA.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample.

Subjects' characteristics	
Mean age (in years)	23
Share of females	52%
Share of students	84%
Share of subjects with experience in lab experiments	62%
Mean net household income (in zł)	5260

Nominal exchange rate 1€ = 4.20zł in 2013.

Average number of rounds equaled 7.62 in the Discriminatory condition, whereas it was much higher (14.31) under Uniform. In the Chat condition the average number of rounds was 12.08 and in the No Chat case it was 10. Not surprisingly, UC sessions lasted longest (106 minutes on average), corresponding figures for other treatments were 63 min., 48 min. and 38 min. for DC, UNC and DNC respectively. In one case, a UC group ended after round 30 without converging.

3. Experimental results

3.1. Rationality of individual behavior

Because the decision making environment was relatively complex, it may be worthwhile first to establish that subjects' behavior followed rules that we would find reasonable. First, we have argued that there were very limited incentives to bid below production value, especially in the discriminatory treatment. It is thus somewhat reassuring to see that such choices were rare. A typical bidder in the Discriminatory condition would make 13.86 offers above the relevant production value (PV) and just 0.21

and 0.41 offers at or below it, respectively (remaining 1.52 plots on average would not be offered at all). Corresponding figures for the Uniform treatment were 10.69, 1.98, 1.03 and 2.30 (note that, in line with our expectations, offers at or below PV were much more common here).

Another check of subjects' ability to respond to strategic incentives important for conservation efforts efficiency would be to compare the bids for "inner" and "outer" columns of each owner's property. Because of the horizontal connectivity bonus, it would on average be more important to have an offer in column B or C accepted than in column A or D because the former would increase attractiveness of two of the same owner's plots, while the latter would only help one offer. Similarly, we expect that offers in column F should be more competitive than in E and in G more than in H.⁴ It turns out this is indeed the case: when we define a variable *relative offer* equal to the offer divided by relevant production value, we find it is indeed modestly but significantly higher for "outer" than "inner" columns: 1.499 vs. 1.484 in Discriminatory and 1.303 vs. 1.280 in Uniform.

Finally, given that the plots in columns G and H had higher environmental value, we would expect our subjects to seize the opportunity and require higher profit margin. Indeed, when compared to plots in columns E and F (i.e. owned by the same subjects), the

⁴ Comparison for these columns is complicated by the fact that G and H provided higher environmental value but this is orthogonal to our definition of "inner" or "outer" columns.

relative offers were much higher for them (1.728 vs. 1.390 in Discriminatory and 1.423 vs. 1.279 in Uniform, both differences are obviously highly significant).

3.2. Treatment effects

There are two major goals in a typical auction: revenue maximization and efficiency seeking. The first involves securing possibly high prices for the objects at sale. In our setting of a multi-unit procurement auction its counterpart was that the government sought to *minimize* unit price, or equivalently maximize EV per dollar spent. This goal was thus incorporated in the procedure determining government's purchase decisions, as explained before. Table 3 shows mean values of the Environmental Value per 1000 Experimental Dollars spent by the government, by treatment (in the last, and hence relevant, round of given auction). As verified by conservative, group-level tests, Discriminatory auctions were marginally superior to Uniform auctions, while that made no difference, see Tables 4 and 5. These tests do not account, however, for differences in production values between groups. If, by chance, plots with low production values tended to be relatively numerous, clustered together and situated next to the NP in, say, UNC groups, it would be easier to obtain high EV per ED values there, compared to other treatments. For this reason we have also calculated relative EV per ED, whereby we divided the EV per 1000 ED by the highest possible EV per 1000 ED obtainable under counterfactual assumption that every plot could be purchased at its production value. The logic behind this procedure is that no owner should be forced to sell at negative profit

margins. The resulting values are also reported in Table 3 and tests in Table 4 and Table 5 verify that, again, chat did not make a difference but Discriminatory auctions fared slightly better than Uniform ones.

Table 3. Mean values of auction characteristics (final round).

Measure		Treatment			
		DC	DNC	UC	UNC
Environmental value	per 1000 ED spent	19.678 (0.423)	18.828 (1.190)	18.636 (1.972)	18.130 (0.687)
	per ED (relative)	0.788 (0.037)	0.750 (0.064)	0.737 (0.057)	0.719 (0.018)
	per 1000 ED of PV lost	24.785 (0.971)	23.942 (0.954)	24.540 (1.929)	22.592 (2.011)
Bonuses	connectivity	27.167 (1.472)	24.571 (1.718)	15.000 (6.229)	20.143 (3.805)
	NP proximity	5.833 (0.543)	4.714 (0.774)	6.778 (0.504)	5.143 (1.719)
	General	0.303 (0.188)	0.327 (0.266)	0.352 (0.179)	0.360 (0.778)
Profit margins from sold plots	all plots	0.260 (0.059)	0.278 (0.117)	0.324 (0.100)	0.251 (0.144)
	plots in the NP buffer zone	0.347 (0.109)	0.430 (0.159)	0.396 (0.100)	0.357 (0.120)
	for plots outside the NP buffer zone	0.179 (0.036)	0.179 (0.098)	0.149 (0.088)	0.204 (0.155)
Earnings (zł)		26.391 (1.901)	26.437 (2.264)	26.344 (2.300)	26.328 (2.538)

Note: Standard deviations reported in parentheses.

Searching for specific reason why EV could be purchased cheaply under D, we have looked at each mechanism’s ability to encourage coordination of conservation efforts, resulting in horizontal corridors of adjacent plots purchased. The total value of connectivity bonus appears to be the most appropriate simple aggregate measure in this respect. Table 3 shows mean values for each of our four treatments. It turns out that the figures were substantially higher for the Discriminatory condition than under uniform pricing, (see test statistics in Table 4). This was largely due to longer corridors being built, with average corridor length being 3.59 under Discriminatory and only 3.02 under Uniform. For example, there were eight maximal corridors (i.e. those of length 8) in Discriminatory groups and only one in the Uniform ones.

Table 4. Treatment effects: Mann-Whitney test results at the group level.

Comparison	Variable	Z	P
Discriminatory vs. Uniform	EV per spent 1000 ED	1.923	0.0545
	Relative EV per ED	2.077	E40.0378
	EV per 1000 ED of PV lost	1.564	0.1178
	Connectivity bonuses	3.840	0.0001
	NP proximity bonuses	- 2.014	0.0440
	Profit Margin (PM)	-1.051	0.2931
	PM in buffer zone	-0.077	0.9387
	PM outside buffer zone	-0.707	0.4795
	Earnings (zł)	-0.385	0.7005
Chat	EV per spent 1000 ED	1.286	0.1985
Vs.	Relative EV per ED	1.440	0.1498
	EV per 1000 ED of PV lost	1.955	0.0506

No Chat	Connectivity bonuses	0.388	0.6982
	NP proximity bonuses	2.694	0.0071
	PM	0.514	0.6070
	PM in buffer zone	-0.103	0.9181
	PM outside buffer zone	-1.150	0.2503
	Earnings (zł)	-0.309	0.7576

Note: Effects significant at 5% shown in bold.

Table 5. Partial treatment effects: Mann-Whitney test results at the group level.

Comparisons							
Discriminatory vs. Uniform				Chat vs. No chat			
Treatment	Variable	Z	P	Treatment	Variable	Z	P
Chat	EV per spent 1000 ED	1.121	0.2623	Discriminatory	EV per spent 1000 ED	1.000	0.3173
	Relative EV per ED	1.725	0.0845		Relative EV per ED	0.857	0.3914
	EV per 1000 ED of PV	0.961	0.3367		EV per 1000 ED of PV	1.571	0.1161
	Connectivity bonuses	2.812	0.0049		Connectivity bonuses	2.308	0.0210
	NP proximity bonuses	-2.290	0.0220		NP proximity bonuses	2.334	0.0196
	PM	-1.601	0.1093		PM	0.000	1.000
	PM in buffer zone	-0.641	0.5218		PM in buffer zone	-0.857	0.3914
	PM outside buffer zone	0.365	0.7150		PM outside buffer zone	0.429	0.6682
	Earnings (zł)	0.320	0.7488		Earnings (zł)	0.143	0.8864
No chat	EV per spent 1000 ED	1.597	0.1102	Uniform	EV per spent 1000 ED	0.571	0.5677
	Relative EV per ED	0.961	0.3367		Relative EV per ED	0.429	0.6682


EV per 1000 ED of PV lost	1.469	0.1417	EV per 1000 ED of PV lost	1.429	0.1531
Connectivity bonuses	2.517	0.0118	Connectivity bonuses	-1.724	0.0847
NP Proximity bonuses	-0.965	0.3347	NP Proximity bonuses	1.803	0.0714
PM	-0.192	0.8480	PM	1.286	0.1985
PM in buffer zone	0.703	0.4822	PM in buffer zone	0.429	0.6682
PM outside buffer zone	-0.703	0.4822	PM outside buffer zone	-1.543	0.1229
Earnings (zł)	-0.831	0.4062	Earnings (zł)	0.000	1.0000

Note: Effects significant at 5% shown in bold.

The other important goal for an auction is that of efficiency—ensuring that objects end up in the hands of agents who value them most. The equivalent in procurement auctions is that services are provided by agents whose costs are lowest. In our case the natural measure is EV obtained per 1000 ED lost in terms of foregone production value. We do not have a natural “ideal” benchmark here, because it is not clear how much each unit of EV is “really” worth and the government did not seek to maximize efficiency. We can however compare efficiency across treatments. As shown in table 3-5 we do not observe a significant effect.

3.3. Evolution of bids over time

Figure 4. Differences in environmental value per ED between the first and the final round.



4 Conclusions

Our study suggests that auction format might make a difference in procurement auctions for the provision of ecosystem services. In particular, in our experiment the government obtained higher environmental value per dollar spent in discriminatory auctions, compared to uniform pricing rule. This was chiefly because connectivity bonuses were higher. To understand why uniform pricing makes long corridors very rare under, consider the example shown in Figure 1. It is nearly impossible to purchase B6 under uniform prices – because of its high production value, even a modest price markup would require all plots (not adjacent to the NP) to be purchased at a very high price. Thus, just one high-PV plot

essentially excludes complete corridor in given row. On the contrary, if A6 and C6 are to be purchased under discriminatory treatment, it can be optimal for the government to additionally purchase B6, provided its owner sets is satisfied with a small profit margin on this plot. On the other hand, such operations may not be optimal from the viewpoint of efficiency, because substantial production value is foregone. This may be one reason why we do not find Discriminatory auctions to be superior in terms of Environmental Value per ED of production lost.

Chat made little impact overall, although it might have facilitated creation of long corridors under Discriminatory, as can be seen in Table 5.

Clearly, our setup has its limitations. It would be desirable to replicate our findings with experienced bidders, more time for reflection and higher stakes. If they prove robust, discriminatory auction formats should be preferred in settings resembling the one discussed here. In view of our results, it is particularly important in environments, in which connectivity plays a major role and cost minimization (rather than efficiency) is the main goal.

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